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Abstract. We show that competitive equilibria in a range of useful production
chain models can be recovered as the solutions to a class of dynamic programming
problems. Bringing dynamic programming to bear on the equilibrium structure of
production chains adds analytical power and opens new avenues for computation.
In addition, the dynamic programming problem that we use to explore production
chains is of interest in its own right, since it provides new optimality results for
intertemporal choice in an empirically relevant setting.
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1. Introduction
The firm size distribution and the concentration of industries within sectors of eco-
nomic activity are correlated with key measures of economic performance and wel-
fare, such as innovation, productivity, volatility of output and labor’s share of in-
come. In the past and once again in recent years, an increase in the level of industry
concentration across a range of sectors has provoked both political controversy and
a search by economists for sharper models of firm size within and across industries.3
1We gratefully acknowledge financial support from JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Re-
search (23000001 and 23330063), Singapore Ministry of Education Academic Research Fund
R-122-000-140-112 and Australian Research Council Award DP120100321. Email contacts:
tomookikuchi@korea.ac.jp, nishimura@rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp, john.stachurski@anu.edu.au,
junnan.zhang@anu.edu.au
a Department of Economics, Korea University; b Research Institute of Economics and Busi-
ness Administration, Kobe University; c, d Research School of Economics, Australian National
University
3A careful study of changes in industry concentration in the US and Europe over the last two
decades can be found in Bajgar et al. (2019). For recent analysis of industry concentration, the
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2Internally consistent models of firm size date back to Coase (1937), who argued
that, since market-based purchases from suppliers can be substituted for in-house
operations, the size of business firms in free market economies must be determined
by a choice of scale that equalizes the marginal cost of these two alternatives. While
debate about the nature of internal and external production costs and their micro-
foundations has been extensive, the principle that profit maximizing firms should
equalize the associated marginal costs remains a natural benchmark and a common
way for economists to communicate and organize ideas (see, e.g., Varian (2002)).
Aside from the size of individual firms, the Coasian framework can also be used to
address the macroscopic issues discussed in the introduction, such as the size dis-
tribution of firms, or other related phenomena such as the structure of production
across international borders. This is done by embedding the framework into larger
equilibrium models with a richer set of features. One example is Fally and Hillberry
(2018), in which firms trade-off coordination costs within the firm against transac-
tion costs outside the firm. Fally and Hillberry (2018) use this approach to shed
new light on the structure of international supply chains. Another study using
the Coasian framework is Kikuchi et al. (2018), where firms in a production chain
equalize the marginal costs of in-house and external operations. The authors use
this model to analyze the relationship between downstreamness and firm size.4
The purpose of our paper is to show that competitive equilibria in a range of pro-
duction chain models, including those listed above, can be recovered as the solution
to a dynamic programming problem. This observation is nontrivial because the
production chain models in question are not dynamic and firm choices are decen-
tralized. The conversion to a dynamic programming problem requires a reinterpre-
tation whereby activities of individual firms are mapped to units of time. Another
reason the connection between competitive equilibria and dynamic programming
is nontrivial in the settings we consider is because transaction costs are admitted.
The standard link between competitive equilibria and optimality breaks down in the
presence of transaction costs. We recover this link via the reinterpretation described
above combined with a modification of the objective function in the planner’s prob-
lem that incorporates transaction costs.
firm size distribution and their impact on measures of economic performance, see, for example,
Aghion et al. (2005), Fernholz and Koch (2017), Mueller et al. (2017), Autor et al. (2017), and
Poschke (2018).
4Also related is Yu and Zhang (2019), who extend some of these ideas to complex production
networks where firms have many upstream partners.
3This exercise as several benefits. One is that the dynamic programming problem
that we are led to through this process is of interest in its own right, since it pro-
vides a foundation for the theory of choice in a commonly observed dynamic setting
(negative discounting) where traditional optimization methods are problematic (see
below for more discussion). A second more obvious benefit is that dynamic pro-
gramming theory can be brought to bear on the theory of the firm and the structure
of production chains, supplying both analytical and computational methods.
We use these ideas to analyze a range of economic problems related to production
chains. We re-examine the equilibrium problems in Fally and Hillberry (2018) and
Kikuchi et al. (2018), in each case using dynamic programming methods to recover
and characterize the equilibrium. This allows us to generate sharper results under
weaker conditions. We also consider the production chain models of Levine (2012)
and Costinot et al. (2013), where failures in production or costly transportation
inhibit specialization. We show below that the core ideas can be analyzed via
our framework. We illustrate the fact that, while failures do inhibit specialization,
their cost is substantially mitigated in equilibrium by endogenous adjustment of the
production chain.
Negative Discount Dynamic Programming. The dynamic programming prob-
lem that we use to study production chains has an interpretation that is entirely
independent of production and, at the same time, of significant interest in its own
right. It involves an agent who (i) seeks to minimize the present value of a sequence
of losses over an infinite horizon, and (ii) assigns future losses greater weight than
current losses. In other words, the subjective discount rate is negative.
More precisely, we consider an agent who exerts effort at > 0 in period t, yielding loss
with time zero value βtℓ(at). Here ℓ is an increasing convex loss function and β > 1.
The actions are assumed to be unavoidable, a requirement we enforce with a forward
looking constraint. This is a kind of “inverse cake eating problem,” where convexity
of ℓ encourages the agent to smooth effort over time, while β > 1 encourages the
agent to finish as soon as possible. The agent must trade off these competing forces
in order to minimize her loss.
This dynamic programming problem stands outside the conventional framework,
where present values of benefit and cost flows are calculated with a positive rate
of discount (corresponding, in the discrete time setting, to a discount factor β that
is strictly less than one). Nevertheless, this problem is of significant independent
4interest. While the positive discount setting is common because it is both consis-
tent with most observed behaviour and mathematically convenient, behavior consis-
tent with positive discounting is not universal. Individuals apply different discount
rates to different decision problems at different times, depending on the nature
of rewards or losses and how the choice problem is framed.5 Moreover, for some
choice problems, future losses or future gains are given greater weight than current
ones. In other words, discount rates are negative. Thaler (1981), Loewenstein
(1987), Horowitz (1988), Loewenstein and Thaler (1989) Loewenstein and Prelec
(1991), Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991) and Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) all
document separate instances of this one phenomenon.
In fact, the range of choice problems when negative discounting has been ob-
served is surprisingly wide. For example, in an analysis of income path preferences,
Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991) found that the majority of surveyed workers re-
ported a preference for increasing wage profiles over decreasing ones, even when it
was pointed out that the latter could be used to construct a dominating consumption
sequence. Loewenstein and Prelec (1991) obtained similar results. In summarizing
their study, they argue that, in the context of the choice problems they examined,
“sequences of outcomes that decline in value are greatly disliked, indicating a neg-
ative rate of time preference” (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1991, p. 351).6
Two findings reported in the literature are worth noting here. First, people regu-
larly exhibit negative discounting when presented with the time allocation of tasks
that generate disutility, such as arduous, unpleasant or uncomfortable experiences
(Loewenstein (1987), Horowitz (1988)).7 Second, long sequences are often associated
with negative discounting. For example, (Frederick et al., 2002, p. 363) find that
positive discounting is typical when the choice is between two outcomes, while prefer-
ences over sequences of outcomes “has generally found that people prefer improving
sequences to declining sequences.” The negative discount dynamic programming
5See, for example, Schelling (1978), Thaler (1981), Kahneman and Thaler (1991),
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992).
6In addition to individual subjective discount rates, another kind of discount rate that can be
negative is that of regulators or social planners. For example, if population is growing and the
planner is utilitarian, then future utilities or losses might be given greater weight than current
ones. This idea was raised in Ramsey (1928), and analyzed in greater detail by Mitra (1981).
7The literature here refer only to settings where the discomfort is transitory rather than per-
manent. Experiences causing permanent loss will typically be delayed as long as possible.
5problem we consider in this paper fits into this empirically relevant setting: Mini-
mizing loss through a sequence of choices over an infinite horizon with a negative
discount rate.
In terms of optimization theory, infinite sequences of payoffs at negative discount
rates can cause substantial difficulties. For example, in discrete time infinite hori-
zon models, where the choice problem is represented as a dynamic program and
rewards are bounded, the Bellman operator satisfies the conditions of Banach’s con-
traction mapping theorem if and only if the discount factor is less than one (see,
e.g., Stokey and Lucas (1989) or Bertsekas (2017)). This contractive property is, in
turn, central to the theory of infinite horizon dynamic programming in the bench-
mark case (see, e.g., Bellman (1957), Blackwell (1965) or Bertsekas (2017)). In
contrast, if we take the discount rate to be negative, then the discount factor is
greater than one and the contraction-based theory then breaks down. No general
theory is available in the literature for this class of problems.
In response, this paper treats the intertemporal choice problem with negative dis-
counting described above and provides a comprehensive optimality theory. In par-
ticular, we establish existence and uniqueness of the minimizing sequence, along
with (a) necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality in the form of first order
and envelope conditions, (b) results on the properties of the optimizing sequence,
such as monotonicity, (c) necessary and sufficient conditions for the task to be com-
pleted in finite time, (d) a recursive view, where we verify validity of the Bellman
equation, convergence of the Bellman operator and optimality of the policy com-
puted from the value function using monotone concave operator theory, and (e) a
set of analogous results for the continuous time setting.
These results make it straightforward to calculate the solution analytically when
possible, as well as to compute the value function and solve for the optimal se-
quence numerically when no analytical solution exists. We note, however, that the
arguments are different to the classical case and certain caveats apply. For example,
to calculate the value function, one cannot simply iterate with the Bellman operator
on an arbitrary continuous bounded function and wait for convergence to the value
function. In fact such sequences typically explode. If, however, the initial condition
is chosen from within a certain class of functions defined in the paper, then uniform
convergence to the value function is guaranteed and, for a large class of problems,
complete convergence occurs in finite time.
6Other Related Literature. Prior to this study, there have been several examples
of dynamic programming being used to study economic outcomes in non-dynamic
settings. One is Hsu et al. (2014), who analyze central place theory via a dynamic
programming formulation of city hierarchy. As in this paper, not only is the solution
recoverable by a dynamic program, but, in addition, this solution can be obtained by
iterating with what amounts to the Bellman operator of the programming problem.
While the study of Hsu et al. (2014) bears this similarity to ours, the dynamic
programs and the target models are structurally and economically different.
On a technical level, our optimality theory is related to other studies of dy-
namic programming where the Bellman operator fails to be a contraction. Impor-
tant recent contributions include Rinco´n-Zapatero and Rodr´ıguez-Palmero (2003)
and Martins-da Rocha and Vailakis (2010), who replace global contractivity with a
form of local contraction. Another approach is found in Kamihigashi (2014) and
Kamihigashi et al. (2015), where topological structure is omitted and analysis of the
Bellman equation and its connection to optimality are based on order theoretic tech-
niques. Our methods are different again. This is due to the fact that the dynamic
program we consider is relatively specialized, allow us to provide direct proofs that
use no elaborate fixed point theory.
Outline. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we
introduce the negative discount dynamic program in discrete time and discuss its
solution. In Section 3, we connect this discussion to Coase’s theory of the firm. In
Section 4 we consider the negative discount dynamic program in continuous time.
In Section 4, we show how the continuous time dynamic program also connects
to Coase’s theory of the firm. Section 5 describes an extension to finite horizons.
Proofs are all deferred to the appendix.
2. Negative Discount DP: Discrete Time Theory
We now state the optimization problem discussed above in the introduction. After
solving it, we will show how to connect it to the sequential production problems
with diminishing returns to management and transaction costs.
2.1. Problem Statement. Consider an agent who takes action at > 0 in period t,
involving loss or disutility with current value ℓ(at). These actions are assumed to be
unavoidable, which we enforce by requiring that
∑∞
t=0 at = x¯ for some fixed positive
7constant x¯. Here and below, a real sequence {at} is called feasible if it satisfies this
constraint and nonnegativity. Over an infinite horizon, the optimization problem
can be expressed as
min
{at}
∞∑
t=0
βtℓ(at) (ML)
subject to feasibility. Regarding the primitives β and ℓ, we assume throughout that
Assumption 2.1. The constant β satisfies β > 1, while ℓ : R+ → R+ is continu-
ously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly convex and satisfies ℓ(0) = 0.
Because ℓ is increasing and strictly convex, the agent will generally prefer to smooth
his or her effort over multiple periods. On the other hand, since β > 1, the agent
prefers to finish the task rather than delay, and effort will be weighted towards
present rather than future. This trade-off is at the heart of the optimization problem.
The assumption ℓ(0) = 0 cannot be weakened, since ℓ(0) > 0 implies that the
objective function is infinite. Conversely, with the assumption ℓ(0) = 0, minimal
loss is always finite. Indeed, by choosing the feasible action path a0 = x¯ and at = 0
for all t > 1, we get
∑∞
t=0 β
tℓ(at) 6 ℓ(x¯). Also, given our other assumptions, there is
no need to consider the case β 6 1 because no solution exists.8 Finally, we exclude
linear loss because the linear case is trivial: the optimal choice is to do everything
in the first period. The same reasoning applies if ℓ is concave.
We can express the problem recursively by introducing a state process {xt} that
starts at x¯ and tracks the amount of tasks remaining. Then, we rewrite the feasibility
constraint as
{at} ∈ R
∞
+ , x0 = x¯, xt+1 = xt − at and lim
t→∞
xt = 0. (1)
It is straightforward to check that, given x¯, the set of feasible sequences is identical
to the set of sequences {at} satisfying (1).
Finally, let
F (x) := min
{
∞∑
t=0
βtℓ(at) : {at} ∈ R
∞
+ and
∞∑
t=0
at = x
}
, ∀ x ∈ R+. (2)
8Because we are minimizing loss, when β < 1 any proposed solution {at} can be strictly improved
by shifting it one step into the future (set a′0 = 0 and a
′
t+1 = at for all t > 0). Furthermore, if
β = 1, and a solution {at} exists, then the increments {at} must converge to zero, and hence there
exists a pair aT and aT+1 with aT > aT+1. Since ℓ is strictly convex, the objective
∑
t
ℓ(at) can
be reduced by redistributing a small amount ǫ from aT to aT+1. This contradicts optimality.
8We call F the value function. Intuitively, F (x) is the cost-to-go from state x, given
that the agent behaves optimally.
2.2. A Recursive Solution. Consider the Bellman equation
f(x) = min
06a6x
{ℓ(a) + βf(x− a)} (x ∈ R+). (3)
Here f(x) ∈ R+ is thought of as representing minimum “cost-to-go” if the agent acts
optimally from state x. The right hand side of (3) captures the trade off between
current loss and future loss discounted at a negative rate of time preference. Denote
by T the Bellman operator corresponding to (3). For any continuous f : R+ → R+,
the operator T satisfies
Tf(x) = min
06a6x
{ℓ(a) + βf(x− a)}. (4)
While (3) appears at first glance to be a standard Bellman equation, T is not a
contraction with respect to any obvious metric because β > 1.9 One consequence is
that, if we take an arbitrary continuous bounded function and iterate with T , the
sequence typically diverges. For example, if f ≡ 1, then, T nf ≡ βn, which diverges
to +∞.
Nonetheless, it turns out that the Bellman operator is well behaved, possessing
properties similar to those found in standard dynamic programming problems, if
we restrict its domain to a certain class of candidate solutions. In particular, let F
be the set of increasing, convex and continuous functions f : R+ → R+ such that
ℓ′(0)x 6 f(x) 6 ℓ(x) for all x ∈ R+. In addition, let η be the unique constant
defined by
η := max {0 6 x 6 x¯ : ℓ′(x) 6 βℓ′(0)}, (5)
existence of which follows from continuity of ℓ′.
Theorem 2.1. If Assumption 2.1 holds and ℓ′(0) > 0, then
1. The Bellman equation (3) has exactly one solution in F , and that solution
is the value function F .
2. For all k ∈ N and all f ∈ F , we have
T kf(x) = F (x) whenever x 6 kη.
In particular, T kf → F uniformly on [0, x¯] as k →∞.
9For example, let f ≡ 1 and g ≡ 0. Then Tf ≡ β and Tg ≡ 0. Hence T is not a contraction
mapping in space of continuous bounded functions under the supremum norm.
93. The function π defined by
π(x) = argmin
06a6x
{ℓ(a) + βF (x− a)},
is well-defined, Lipschitz continuous and increasing.
4. The value function F is strictly convex, strictly increasing and continuously
differentiable on (0, x¯), with
F ′(x) = ℓ′(π(x)) whenever x > 0. (6)
5. The sequence of actions {a∗t} defined by a
∗
t = π(xt) with
x0 = x¯ and xt+1 = xt − π(xt)
is the unique solution to (ML).
6. The optimal sequence {a∗t} is decreasing and satisfies
ℓ′(a∗t+1) = max
{
1
β
ℓ′(a∗t ), ℓ
′(0)
}
, ∀ t > 0. (7)
Moreover, {a∗t} is the only nonnegative feasible sequence that satisfies this
restriction.
Some of these are relatively familiar dynamic programming results, although the
proofs are different due to lack of contractivity. One unusual result is part 2 of the
theorem, which indicates an unusually strong form of convergence for the Bellman
operator: uniform convergence in finite time. In particular, for k > x¯/η we have
T kf = F everywhere on [0, x¯]. Notice that this bound x¯/η is independent of the
initial condition f .
Equation (7) is akin to an Euler equation with a possibly binding constraint. The
monotonicity result in part 6 is unsurprising: future losses are given greater weight
than current losses, and hence {a∗t} is chosen to be monotonically declining over
time.
2.3. Zero Marginal Loss at the Origin. What of the case ℓ′(0) = 0? Although
the Bellman operator no longer converges in finitely many steps, the problem is in
other ways simpler because the agent never finishes the task in finite time, smoothing
away the corner solution. Because of this, the following optimality result can be
established through elementary arguments.
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Theorem 2.2. If Assumption 2.1 holds and ℓ′(0) = 0, then a feasible sequence {a∗t}
solves (ML) if and only if
ℓ′(a∗t+1) =
1
β
ℓ′(a∗t ) for all t > 0. (8)
This sequence is unique, decreasing, and satisfies a∗t > 0 for all t.
Combining Theorem 2.1 and 2.2, we see that the set of tasks will be completed in
finite time if and only if ℓ′(0) > 0.
In practice the case ℓ′(0) = 0 is relatively simple, and typically yields an analytical
solution. The next example illustrates.
Example 2.1. Let ℓ(x) = κxγ with κ > 0 and γ > 1. Let β > 1 be given.
Evidently Assumption 2.1 holds. Since ℓ′(0) = 0, the Euler equality (8) applies,
yielding at+1 = θat for all t > 0 when θ := β
1/(1−γ). Since β, γ > 1 we have
0 < θ < 1. From the constraint
∑∞
t=0 at = x¯, we obtain at = θ
t(1 − θ)x¯. This is
the optimal action path for the agent. Substituting this path into (2), the value
function is seen to be
F (x) = κ
(
1− β1/(1−γ)
)γ−1
xγ . (9)
As anticipated by the theory, F is strictly increasing and strictly convex.
3. Applications of the Discrete Time Theory
The dynamic programming problem treated in Section 2 was motivated by intertem-
poral choice with a negative discount rate. How does this dynamic programming
problem connects to Coase’s theory of the firm?
To illustrate the connection, we first consider a version of a Coasian model found in
Kikuchi et al. (2018) that adopts their framework but weakens their assumptions on
the cost function for individual firms. Next, we add in a more detailed production
technology, which leads to sharper predictions that the original model. Throughout,
the primary focus is on how the competitive equilibrium that determines the size of
each firm can be calculated using dynamic programming.
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3.1. A Coasian Production Chain. Coase argued that, on one hand, in-house
production becomes expensive as the range and scale of operations increase, due
to spreading layers of management and bureaucratic inefficiencies.10 On the other
hand, free market purchases from suppliers attract transaction costs. Equalizing
the marginal costs of in-house and market-based operations requires confronting the
trade-off between these forces: “diminishing returns to management” inside the firm
and transaction costs outside the firm.
We formalize these ideas in the same manner as Kikuchi et al. (2018). We consider a
large and competitive market with many price-taking firms, each of which is either
inactive or involved in the production of a single good. To produce of one unit
of this good requires implementation of a range of tasks, modeled as a continuum
and indexed by s ∈ [0, 1]. A production chain is a finite collection of firms that,
collectively, implements all of these tasks and produces the final good. Firms face
no fixed costs or barriers to entry.
Let c(v) be the cost for any one firm of implementing an interval of tasks with
length v. As in Kikuchi et al. (2018), we assume that c is increasing, strictly convex,
continuously differentiable and satisfies c(0) = 0. At the same time, we drop their
assumption that c′(0) > 0. The strict convexity of c corresponds to diminishing
returns to management.
Transaction costs are a wedge between price paid by the buyer and payment received
by the seller.11 The share of transaction costs paid by each party matters little
for our purposes, so, for convenience, we assume that the transaction cost falls
entirely on the buyers. In particular, when a transaction occurs with face value
f , the seller receives f and the buyer pays (1 + τ)f , where τ > 0 parameterizes
the transaction costs in this market. For example, τf might be the cost of writing
a contract for a transaction with face value f . This cost rises in f because more
expensive transactions merit more careful contracts. (There are, of course, many
other possible interpretations for τ , some of which are touched on below.)
10These ideas appear in many studies under different names. For example, it finds expression in
the “span-of-control” costs highlighted by, say, Lucas (1978), ? or ?, and the “coordination costs”
of Becker and Murphy (1992).
11This follows Kikuchi et al. (2018) and also studies such as Boehm and Oberfield (2018), where
frictions in contract enforcement are treated as a variable wedge between effective cost to the buyer
and payment to the supplier.
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3.1.1. Equilibrium. Firms are indexed by integers i > 0. An allocation of tasks
across firms is a nonnegative sequence v = {vi} with
∑
i>0 vi = 1. For convenience,
we always identify firm 0 with the most downstream firm, firm 1 with the second
most downstream firm, and so on. (This is just a labeling convention.) Let bi be
the downstream boundary of firm i, so that b0 = 1 and bi = bi−1 − vi−1 for all i. As
transaction costs are incurred only by the buyer, profits of the i-th firm are
Πi = p(bi)− c(vi)− (1 + τ)p(bi+1). (10)
Here p is a price function, which is a map from [0, 1] to R+, with p(t) interpreted
as the price of the good at processing stage t.
Definition 3.1. Given a price function p and a feasible allocation v = {vi}, and
let {πi} be corresponding profits, as defined in (10). The pair (p,v) is called an
equilibrium for the production chain if
1. p(0) = 0,
2. p(s)− c(s− t)− (1 + τ)p(t) 6 0 for any pair s, t with 0 6 t 6 s 6 1, and
3. Πi = 0 for all i.
Condition 1 rules out profits for suppliers of initial inputs, which are assumed for
convenience to have zero cost of production. Condition 2 ensures that no firm in
the production chain has an incentive to deviate, and that inactive firms cannot
enter and extract positive profits. Condition 3 requires that active firms make zero
profits, due to free entry and an infinite fringe of potential competitors. (Profits are
never negative in equilibrium because firms can freely exit.)
3.1.2. Solution by Dynamic Programming. Consider a version of the dynamic pro-
gramming problem described in Section 2, where a (fictitious) agent seeks to min-
imize
∑
t>0(1 + τ)
tc(at) subject to
∑
t>0 at = 1. In other words, we specialize the
problem to one where x¯ = 1, ℓ = c and β = 1+ τ . Since Assumption 2.1 is satisfied,
we know that there exists a unique solution a∗ := {a∗i }. Let F be the corresponding
value function. The next result tells us that the solution to this dynamic program
is precisely the competitive equilibrium of the Coasian production chain described
in Section 3.1.
Proposition 3.1. The pair (F, a∗) is an equilibrium for the production chain.
13
One immediate insight from this result is as follows: We know from Theorem 2.1,
Part 4, that the price function is continuously differentiable on (0, 1) and, for firm
with downstream boundary bi,
F ′(bi) = c
′(a∗i ). (11)
Since a∗i is the optimal range of tasks implemented in-house by firm i in equilibrium,
this is an expression of Coase’s key idea: that the size of the firm is determined as
the scale that equalizes the marginal cost of in-house and market-based production.
Another implication of Theorems 2.1–2.2 is that {a∗i } is decreasing. In other words,
firm size increases with downstreamness. This generalizes a finding along the same
lines from Kikuchi et al. (2018).
3.1.3. An Example with Closed Form Solution. As a simple example with closed
form solutions, suppose that the range of tasks v implemented by a given firm
satisfies v = f(k, n), where k is capital and n is labor. Given rental rate r and
wage rate w, the cost function is c(v) := mink,n{rk + wn} subject to f(k, n) > v.
Let us suppose further that, as in Lucas (1978), the production function has the
form φ(g(k, n)), where g is constant returns to scale and φ is increasing and strictly
concave, with the latter property to due to “span-of-control” costs. To generate the
closed-form solution, we take
g(k, n) = Akαn(1−α) and φ(x) = xη (12)
with 0 < α, η < 1. The resulting cost function has the form c(v) = κv1/η, where κ
is a positive constant.
As in Section 3.1.2, we can solve this by dynamic programming, setting c = ℓ and
β = 1+ τ . Then, by Proposition 3.1, the optimal action path for the fictitious agent
corresponds to the equilibrium production chain for firms, and the value function is
the equilibrium price function. Since c = ℓ has the same form as the loss function
in Example 2.1, we know that the equilibrium is the allocation-price pair (v, p∗)
defined by
vi = θ
i(1− θ) and p∗(s) = κ (1− θ)(1−η)/η s1/η (13)
where
θ := (1 + τ)η/(η−1).
Although this example lies outside the framework of Kikuchi et al. (2018), since
c′(0) = 0, we replicate their result that the size of firms increases from upstream
14
to downstream (recalling that larger i corresponds to further upstream). In this
particular case, the growth rate of firms as we move downstream is constant. We
also see that the price function is strictly convex due to the costly span of control.
Intuitively, span-of-control costs at the firm level cannot be eliminated in aggregate
due to transaction costs, which force firms to maintain a certain size. This leads
to strict convexity of prices in s, which might be understood as the complexity of
the product. If the span-of-control cost is removed, by setting η = 1, then the price
function becomes linear.
3.2. Specialization and Failure Probabilities. It is possible to give alternative
interpretations of the model above. For example, consider the studies of specializa-
tion and failure probabilities found in, among others, the O-ring theory of economic
development by Kremer (1993) and the production chain models of Levine (2012)
and Costinot et al. (2013). For example, the key idea in Kremer’s O-ring theory of
economic development (Kremer, 1993) is that production processes consist of a series
of complementary tasks, and mistakes in any of the tasks can dramatically reduce
the product’s value. To mitigate this exponential impact on the product’s value,
Kremer’s model has an assortative matching of workers who have different proba-
bilities of making mistakes and the length of production chains (number of tasks)
adjusts accordingly. For example, high failure workers are grouped together and
build a shorter production chain. The models of Levine (2012) and Costinot et al.
(2013) have similar features, where equilibrium allocations serve to mitigate the
potentially exponential cost of failures in long production chains.12
A similar analysis can be derived from the model of production chains explored in
Section 3.1 under a suitable modification. To see this, consider, as before, a large
competitive market where producers implement a sequence of tasks indexed by s ∈
[0, 1]. We remove the assumption of positive transaction costs, which corresponds to
τ = 0 in our previous notation. Instead, the friction between firms is due to positive
probability of defects. Defects can alternatively be understood as iceberg costs,
where some percentage of goods are lost in transporting them from one producer to
12In Levine (2012), long chains involve a high degree of specialization and produce a large
quantity of output but are also more prone to failure. However, chains in his model are long
only if the failure rate is low thus mitigating the exponential impact that production failure of a
single link has on output. Similarly, Costinot et al. (2013), in a global supply chain model where
production of the final goods is sequential and subject ot mistakes, shows that countries with lower
probabilities of making mistakes specialize in later stages of production.
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the next. This implies that producer who buys at stage t and sells at s > t must
buy β > 1 units of the partially completed good at t to sell one unit of the processed
good at s. Profits for such a firm when confronting price function p are
Π = p(s)− c(s− t)− βp(t).
This parallels the profit function (10) from the Coasian case and the rest of the
analysis is essentially identical. In particular, if we assume the Cobb–Douglass
production technology from Section 3.1.3, then (13) is valid with θ = βη/(η−1). The
price of the final good is therefore
p∗(1) = κ
(
1− βη/(η−1)
)(1−η)/η
(14)
Note that a rise in the failure probability 1− 1/β leads to only a moderate increase
in the final good price. This is because producers increase their range of production
to mitigate the rise in cost associated with a higher production failure of upstream
producers. As a result, there are fewer producers in production chains and the
compounding effect of higher production failures is limited.
It is interesting to compare this with a hypothetical model where producers do not
adjust their production according to failure probabilities. Suppose in particular that
production chains are simply divided into equal tasks by N producers. In this case,
the final good price is
pˆ∗(1) = κ
N∑
i=0
βi
(
1
N
)1/η
= κ
βN − 1
β − 1
(
1
N
)1/η
= O(βN). (15)
Now a small increase in the failure probability increases the final good price ex-
ponentially. This is intuitive, as an increase in cost compounds over all producers
involved in the production chain.
Thus, returning to the original model, we see that equilibrium prices induce pro-
ducers to adjust to changes in failure probabilities, which optimally mitigates the
potentially exponential impact of failures on the cost of the final good. While this
discussion is only suggestive, it does show that the ideas in Kremer (1993), Levine
(2012) and Costinot et al. (2013) are, like those of Coase, amenable to analysis using
negative discount dynamic programming theory.
4. Continuous Time: Theory and Applications
In this section, we give a set of results for dynamic optimization in continuous time
that parallel the discrete time results in Section 2. We begin with optimality results
16
and then proceed to show how such results can be connected to production chains
and the theory of the firm.
4.1. An Infinite Horizon Problem. As before, consider an agent who takes ac-
tions to complete a task and tries to minimize the total loss from her actions. The
continuous time version of problem (ML) is
min
a(t)
∫ ∞
0
eρtℓ(a(t))dt (MLC)
subject to feasibility of a(t). Now feasibility means that a is a nonnegative real
function on R+, with at most finitely many points of discontinuity, and satisfying∫∞
0
a(t)dt = x¯.
Assumption 4.1. The constant ρ is strictly positive, while ℓ : R+ → R+ is contin-
uously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly convex and satisfies ℓ(0) = 0.
Positivity of ρ indicates that future losses are given more weight than current ones.
The conditions on ℓ are identical to those in Assumption 2.1.
Now let us consider a recursive formulation, to parallel the discrete time results in
Section 2.2. The state path corresponding to a control a(t) is now
x(t) =
∫ ∞
t
a(s)ds. (16)
Similar to (2), we can also define the value function by
F (x) := min
a(t)
{∫ ∞
0
eρtℓ(a(t))dt : a(t) > 0 and
∫ ∞
0
a(t)dt = x
}
, ∀x ∈ R+,
(17)
which is the minimal cost when the amount of tasks to be completed is x. We then
have the following continuous time version of Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 4.1. If Assumption 4.1 holds, then
1. there exists a unique feasible solution a∗ to (MLC). It satisfies
a∗(t) = argmin
a>0
{
eρtℓ(a) + λa
}
(18)
where λ is a constant uniquely determined by the feasibility constraint∫ ∞
0
a∗(t)dt = x¯. (19)
2. The optimal action a∗(t) is decreasing in t. Moreover,
17
C1. if ℓ′(0) = 0, then ℓ′(a∗(t)) = −λe−ρt and a∗(t) > 0 for all t; and
C2. if ℓ′(0) > 0, then there is a finite T¯ such that a∗(t) = 0 for all t > T¯ .
3. The value function F (x) is differentiable when x > 0, and it satisfies
− ρF (x) = inf
a>0
{ℓ(a)− F ′(x)a} (20)
with boundary condition F (0) = 0 and the optimal action a∗ at state x sat-
isfies
− ρF (x) = inf
a>0
{ℓ(a)− F ′(x)a} = ℓ(a∗)− F ′(x)a∗. (21)
Equation (18) can be seen as the continuous time Euler equation. For example, if
ℓ′(0) = 0, then, by C1 of Theorem 4.1, we have ℓ′(a∗(t)) = −e−ρtλ, and hence
ℓ′(a∗(t′)) = eρ(t−t
′)ℓ′(a∗(t)) for any t′ > t.
This is a continuous time version of (8). Furthermore, if a∗ is an interior solution in
(21), we have F ′(x) = ℓ′(a∗), which is similar to (6) in the discrete case and gives an
envelope-like condition between the value function and the loss function. The proof
can be found in Appendix B.1
Example 4.1. Consider again the case ℓ(x) = xγ with γ > 1, previously considered
in discrete time. Since ℓ′(0) = 0, Theorem 4.1 implies that a∗(t) = (−λe−ρt/γ)1/(γ−1).
Using (19) to pin down λ and substituting into the solution gives
a∗(t) = θx¯e−θt. where θ :=
ρ
γ − 1
. (22)
Combining (16) and (22), we have
x∗(t) =
∫ ∞
t
a∗(s)ds = x¯e−
ρ
γ−1
t.
Now the optimal action can be expressed as a∗ = ρx∗/(γ − 1), which is always
proportional to the state. This relation demonstrates the trade-off between current
loss and negatively discounted future losses. If γ is large, the agent will choose
to complete a smaller portion of the remaining tasks each time because the loss
function ℓ(a) grows rapidly with a. On the other hand, if ρ is large, the agent will
try to complete the tasks faster because of the greater weight given to future losses
indicated by eρt. Plugging a∗ into (17) gives the value function
F (x) =
(
ρ
γ − 1
)γ−1
xγ ,
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which is increasing in the amount of tasks x. Also, given x, the value function is
increasing in the discount factor ρ. Although the agent will try to finish the tasks
faster when ρ increases, minimal cost is still larger.
4.2. An Application of the Continuous Time Theory. This section shows
how the continuous time negative discount dynamic programming results can be
applied to production chains and the theory of the firm. To begin, let us consider
a version of the Coasian production chain model in Section 3.1 that is essentially
parallel except that, as in Fally and Hillberry (2018), there is a continuum of firms.
Firms are indexed by i ∈ R+, with i = 0 being the most downstream firm. Let a(i)
be the range of tasks firm i chooses to implement and let p(i) be the price at which
firm i sells the partially completed good. The cost of producing a(i) is c (a(i)). To
finish the final product, a(·) has to satisfy
∫∞
0
a(i)di = 1. Buyers bear transaction
costs, so firm i pays τ di · p(i+ di) for every unit purchased from firm i+ di where
τ > 0. Hence, the total cost for firm i is
c(a(i))di+ (1 + τ di) · p(i+ di).
In equilibrium, firms optimize and make zero profit, so any price function p(i) and
optimal production a∗(i) must satisfy13
0 = c(a∗(i)) + τp(i) + p′(i)
= min
a
{c(a(i)) + τp(i) + p′(i)} .
(23)
To utilize our continuous time theory in Section 4.1, we define a new price function
F : [0, 1] → R+ by F (x(i)) := p(i), where x(i) corresponds to the stage
14 at which
firm i sells its product.
Given differential equation (23), the equilibrium price function F , optimal produc-
tion a∗, and optimal path x∗ must satisfy
0 = c(a∗(i)) + τF (x∗(i))− F ′(x∗(i))a∗(i)
= min
a
{c(a(i)) + τF (x∗(i))− F ′(x∗(i))a(i)} ,
(24)
where we use the fact that (x∗)′ = −a∗. Since we assume that initial inputs have
zero cost, a boundary condition F (0) = 0 must also be satisfied.
13Here we write the equilibrium conditions in differential form.
14This is parallel to the state path (16) in Section 4.1. If the firms in the chain produce according
to a(·), the stage for firm i can be computed by x(i) =
∫
∞
i
a(j)dj. For example, the stage for firm
0 is x(0) =
∫
∞
0
a(j)dj = 1.
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To find the equilibrium price and optimal production function, we first suppose that
there is a social planner who minimizes the price of the final good p(0). By solving
the differential equation (23), we have
p(0) =
∫ ∞
0
eτic(a(i))di+ C,
where C is any constant. Therefore, the planner solves
min
a(i)
∫ ∞
0
eτic(a(i))di s.t. a(i) > 0 and
∫ ∞
0
a(i)di = 1,
which is the same as problem (MLC) with x¯ = 1.
It follows from Theorem 4.1 that this problem has exactly one solution, the value
function F (·) corresponding to the equilibrium price satisfies the differential equa-
tion (24) and the boundary condition F (0) = 0, and the optimal production a∗(i)
is decreasing in i, suggesting that firm size is increasing in downstreamness. More-
over, by the remarks after Theorem 4.1, the solutions also satisfy F ′(x∗) = c′(a∗), a
similar condition to (11) in discrete time, which says that firms expands until the
marginal cost of in-house production equals the marginal cost of purchasing from a
supplier.
5. Extension: A Finite Horizon Problem
Next we consider a finite horizon version of the negative discount dynamic program-
ming problem. We then show that this problem also has applications in the study
of equilibria in production chains.
5.1. Negative Discount Optimization with a Finite Horizon. The objective
is to choose feasible action path a and a terminal date T to solve
min
a(t),T
∫ T
0
eρtℓ(a(t))dt+ L(T ) s.t. a(t) > 0 and
∫ T
0
a(t)dt = x¯ (MLCF)
The terminal cost function L is assumed to be increasing, twice continuously differ-
entiable, and to satisfy L(t) → ∞ as t → ∞. Note that the time horizon itself is
also a choice variable.
Theorem 5.1. Let Assumption 4.1 hold and suppose, in addition, that ℓ′(0) = 0.
Let λ and T ∗ be constants and let
a∗(t) := (ℓ′)−1(−λe−ρt). (25)
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If λ and T ∗ are such that
∫ T ∗
0
a∗(t)dt = x¯ and −λa∗(T ∗)−eρT
∗
ℓ(a∗(T ∗))−L′(T ∗) = 0
both hold, then a∗ solves (MLCF) and a∗(t) is decreasing in t.
This theorem gives sufficient conditions for the control function to be optimal in the
finite horizon problem (MLCF). Compared with Theorem 4.1, there is an additional
condition involving L′(T ∗) because the agent is also choosing the terminal date in
this problem. An application that uses this theorem can be found in Section 5.2.
5.2. International Production Chains. Fally and Hillberry (2018) provide a cal-
ibrated general equilibrium model of production across national boundaries. The
production chain component is similar to the continuous-time model we analyzed
in Section 4.2, although the mathematical result we apply corresponds to the finite
horizon dynamic program from Theorem 5.1. This section gives details.
In Fally and Hillberry (2018), a production chain for a single final product consists
of firms across multiple countries. In this section, we will restrict our attention
to equilibria within one country that imports an intermediate good and exports a
partially finished product after sequential production along the chain. Similar to
the set-up in Section 4.2, firms face transaction costs and diseconomies of scope and
are indexed by i ∈ R+. Given the import price B and the amount of production to
be completed x¯, a social planner minimizes the price of the export good by choosing
not only the amount each firm produces a(i), but also the total “number” of firms
I in this country. Due to transaction costs, the price of the export good is∫ I
0
eτic(a(i))di+BeτI ,
where the first part is the total cost along the chain and the second part is from the
import price. The social planner’s problem is thus
min
a(i),I
∫ I
0
eτic(a(i))di+BeτI s.t. a(i) > 0 and
∫ I
0
a(i)di = x¯.
To solve the planner’s problem, we can directly apply Theorem 5.1, which offers
sufficient conditions for the optimal solutions. We show in the appendix that all
the conditions are satisfied for the parameterizations in Fally and Hillberry (2018),
and thus their proposed solution is indeed optimal. Theorem 5.1 complements their
necessity results in that it provides a way to test the optimality of any solution. It
is also able to deal with a wider range of functional forms beyond what is discussed
above. A more general version of Theorem 5.1 can also be found in Appendix B.2.
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6. Conclusion
This paper shows how competitive equilibria in a class of production chain models
can be recovered as the solution to a dynamic programming problem. In particular,
equilibrium prices in the production model are identified with the value function of
a dynamic program, while competitive allocations of tasks across firms are identified
with choices under the optimal policy. As a result, dynamic programming methods
can be brought to bear on both the theory of the firm and the structure of produc-
tion chains, providing new analytical and computational methods. The dynamic
programming problem connected to production chains via the theory in this paper
is of interest in its own right, since it provides a foundation for the theory of choice
in an empirically relevant setting.
There are several avenues for more work on these topics. For example, in-house
costs in the production chain models treated above are invariant with respect to
upstreamness. This assumption could potentially be relaxed without breaking the
link to dynamic programming, provided that the dynamic program is allowed to be
nonstationary. Such issues are left for future research.
Appendix A. Proofs for Discrete Time Theory
Assumption 2.1 is imposed throughout.
Preliminary Results. We begin with several lemmas. The proof of the first lemma
is trivial and hence omitted.
Lemma A.1. We have η > 0 if and only if ℓ′(0) > 0. If η < x¯, then ℓ′(η) = βℓ′(0).
Lemma A.2. If {at} is a solution to (ML), then {at} is monotone decreasing and
aT+1 = 0 if and only if aT 6 η.
Proof. The first claim is obvious, because if {at} is a solution to (ML) with at < at+1,
then, given that β > 1, swapping the values of these two points in the sequence will
preserve the constraint while strictly decreasing total loss. Regarding the second
claim, since {at} is monotone decreasing, it suffices to check the case aT > 0. To
this end, suppose to the contrary that {at} is a solution to (ML) with 0 < aT < η and
aT+1 > 0. Consider an alternative feasible sequence {aˆt} defined by aˆT = aT + ǫ,
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aˆT+1 = aT+1 − ǫ and aˆt = at for other t. If we compare the values of these two
sequences we get
∞∑
t=0
βtℓ(at)−
∞∑
t=0
βtℓ(aˆt) = β
T [ℓ(aT )− ℓ(aT + ǫ)] + β
T+1[ℓ(aT+1)− ℓ(aT+1 − ǫ)]
= ǫβT
{
−
ℓ(aT + ǫ)− ℓ(aT )
ǫ
+ β
ℓ(aT+1 − ǫ)− ℓ(aT+1)
−ǫ
}
.
The term inside the parenthesis converges to
−ℓ′(aT ) + βℓ
′(aT+1) > −ℓ
′(η) + βℓ′(0) > 0,
where the first inequality follows from aT 6 η, aT+1 > 0 and strict convexity of ℓ;
and the second inequality is by the definition of η. We conclude that for ǫ sufficiently
small, the difference
∑∞
t=0 β
tℓ(at)−
∑∞
t=0 β
tℓ(aˆt) is positive, contradicting optimality.
Finally we check the claim aT+1 = 0 =⇒ aT 6 η. Note that if η = x¯ then there
is nothing to prove, so we can and do take η < x¯. Seeking a contradiction, suppose
instead that aT+1 = 0 and aT > η. Consider an alternative feasible sequence {aˆt}
defined by aˆT = aT − ǫ, aˆT+1 = ǫ and aˆt = at for other t. In this case we have
∞∑
t=0
βtℓ(at)−
∞∑
t=0
βtℓ(aˆt) = ǫβ
T
{
ℓ(aT − ǫ)− ℓ(aT )
−ǫ
− β
ℓ(ǫ)− ℓ(0)
ǫ
}
.
The term inside the parentheses converges to
ℓ′(aT )− βℓ
′(0) > ℓ′(η)− βℓ′(0) = 0,
where the final equality is due to η < x¯ and Lemma A.1. Once again we conclude
that for ǫ sufficiently small, the difference
∑∞
t=0 β
tℓ(at) −
∑∞
t=0 β
tℓ(aˆt) is positive,
contradicting optimality. 
Our next result shows that if ℓ′(0) = 0 then any optimal sequence is strictly positive,
while if ℓ′(0) > 0, then it has only finitely many positive terms.
Lemma A.3. Let {at} be a solution to (ML). If ℓ
′(0) = 0 then at > 0 for all t.
On the other hand, if ℓ′(0) > 0, then there exists a unique T = T (ℓ, β, x¯) ∈ N ∪ {0}
such that at > 0 if and only if t 6 T .
Proof. Let {at} is a solution to (ML). If ℓ
′(0) = 0, then by Lemma A.1 we have
η = 0, and hence, by Lemma A.2, at = 0 implies at−1 = 0. Since the sequence is
decreasing, if follows that if at = 0 for some t, then at = 0 for all t. This violates
the constraint. Hence at > 0 for all t.
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Regarding the second claim, if ℓ′(0) > 0 then η > 0 by Lemma A.1. Since
∑
t at = x¯,
we have at → 0, and hence at is less than η eventually. It follows that at = 0 for
some t. From the assumption x¯ > 0 we have at > 0 for at least one t. The claim
now follows from monotonicity. 
Proposition A.4. A sequence {at} ∈ R
∞
+ satisfying
∑∞
t=0 at = x¯ is optimal if and
only if it satisfies
ℓ′(at+1) = max
{
1
β
ℓ′(at), ℓ
′(0)
}
, ∀ t > 0. (26)
Proof. Suppose first that {at} ∈ R
∞
+ is optimal. We claim that (26) holds. To show
that this is true, it is enough to show that
(a) If at > η, then ℓ
′(at+1) = ℓ
′(at)/β and ℓ
′(at)/β > ℓ
′(0).
(b) If at 6 η, then ℓ
′(at+1) = ℓ
′(0) and ℓ′(at)/β 6 ℓ
′(0).
Regarding (a), suppose that aT > η. In view of Lemma A.2 we have aT+1 > 0.
As in the proof of Lemma A.2, if we define an alternative feasible sequence {aˆt} by
aˆT = aT + ǫ, aˆT+1 = aT+1 − ǫ and aˆt = at for other t, then
∞∑
t=0
βtℓ(at)−
∞∑
t=0
βtℓ(aˆt) = ǫβ
T
{
−
ℓ(aT + ǫ)− ℓ(aT )
ǫ
+ β
ℓ(aT+1 − ǫ)− ℓ(aT+1)
−ǫ
}
,
The term inside the parentheses converges to −ℓ′(aT ) + βℓ
′(aT+1). If this term
is strictly positive, then choosing a small positive ǫ makes the difference between
the sums positive, contradicting optimality. On the other hand, if this term is
strictly negative, then choosing a small negative ǫ again makes the difference posi-
tive, contradicting optimality. Hence ℓ′(aT ) = βℓ
′(aT+1) as claimed. Moreover, since
ℓ′(aT+1) > ℓ
′(0), the same equality also yields ℓ′(aT )/β > ℓ
′(0). Hence the claim in
(a) is valid.
Regarding claim (b), if at 6 η, then by Lemma A.2 we have at+1 = 0. Hence
ℓ′(at+1) = 0. Moreover, by the definition of η the assumption at 6 η, we have
ℓ′(at) β 6 ℓ
′(0). Hence (b) is also valid. This completes the proof that optimality
implies (26).
Next we show sufficiency. To this end, let {at} ∈ R
∞
+ be a sequence satisfying (26)
and
∑
t at = x¯. Let {aˆt} be another sequence in R
∞
+ with
∑
t aˆt = x¯. Let x0 := x¯
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and xt+1 := xt − at. Similarly, let xˆ0 := x¯ and xˆt+1 := xˆt − aˆt. Let
DT :=
T∑
t=0
βt{ℓ(aˆt)− ℓ(at)}.
It suffices to prove that limT→∞DT > 0. To this end, observe that, by convexity of
ℓ,
DT =
T∑
t=0
βt{ℓ(xˆt − xˆt+1)− ℓ(xt − xt+1)}
>
T∑
t=0
βt{ℓ′(xt − xt+1)(xˆt − xt)− ℓ
′(xt − xt+1)(xˆt+1 − xt+1)}
=
T∑
t=0
βt{ℓ′(at)(xˆt − xt)− ℓ
′(at)(xˆt+1 − xt+1)}.
By simple rearrangement, and using the fact that xˆ0 = x0 and hence ℓ
′(a0)(xˆ0−x0) =
0, we can write this bound as
DT > −
T−1∑
t=0
βt[ℓ′(at)− βℓ
′(at+1)](xˆt+1 − xt+1)− β
T ℓ′(aT )(xˆT+1 − xT+1).
Suppose for the moment that
[ℓ′(at)− βℓ
′(at+1)](xˆt+1 − xt+1) 6 0, ∀ t > 0. (27)
In this case we have
DT > −β
T ℓ′(aT )(xˆT+1 − xT+1).
Since this term clearly converges to zero, it remains only to show that (27) holds.
To this end, first suppose that at > η. Then, by the definition of η, we have
ℓ′(at) > βℓ
′(0), and hence, by (26), ℓ′(at) = βℓ
′(at+1). It follows that the term in
(27) is zero. Next suppose that at < η. Then ℓ
′(at) < βℓ
′(0), and hence, by (26),
ℓ′(at+1) = ℓ
′(0). Since ℓ′ is strictly increasing, this gives at+1 = 0. Repeating the
argument at t + 1 instead of t gives at+2 = 0, and continuing in this way, at+j = 0
for all j > 1. This implies that xt+k = xt+1 for all k > 1. From (26) we know that∑
t at = x¯, and hence xt → 0. It now follows that xt+1 = 0. Applying (26) again
yields ℓ′(at)− βℓ
′(at+1) 6 0, and we conclude once again that (27) is valid. 
Proposition A.5. There exists exactly one feasible sequence {at} satisfying (26).
Proof. Let h be the function associated with the Euler equation in (26). That is,
h(s) = (ℓ′)−1{max{ℓ′(s)/β, ℓ′(0)}}.
25
Evidently h is continuous and strictly increasing, and hence so is its t-th self-iterate
ht. For each given x ∈ R+, the sequence {at(x)} defined by at(x) := h
t(x) satisfies
the Euler equation in (26). Varying x over R+ gives the set of all sequences {at}
in R∞+ that satisfy the Euler equation. We need to show that one and only one of
these sequences sums to x¯.
To this end, let H(x) :=
∑∞
t=0 h
t(x), where h0(x) := x. Using the fact that ht is con-
tinuous and strictly increasing combined with the monotone convergence theorem,
it is trivial to show that H is both left- and right-continuous at any given x. Hence
H is a continuous function. Evidently H(x¯) > x¯ and H(0) 6 x¯. It follows from the
intermediate value theorem that there exists an s¯ ∈ [0, x¯] such that H(s¯) = x¯. Since
H is strictly increasing, there is no other point x ∈ [0, x¯] that satisfies this equality.
Hence if we take a0 := s¯ and at := h
t(s¯), we obtain the unique sequence in R∞+ that
satisfies the two conditions in (26). 
A Recursive Representation. Next we turn to the recursive representation.
Throughout the proofs, we regularly use the alternative expression for T given by
Tf(x) = min
06y6x
{ℓ(x− y) + βf(y)} (28)
Also, given f ∈ F , define
σf (x) := argmin
y6x
{ℓ(x− y) + βf(y)} = x− πf(x). (29)
and
πf (x) = argmin
06a6x
{ℓ(a) + βf(x− a)}.
These functions are clearly well-defined, unique and single-valued. We call πf the
f -greedy function. Let π := πF be the F -greedy function.
Lemma A.6. Let f ∈ F . If x1, x2 satisfy 0 < x1 6 x2, then
1. σf(x1) 6 σf (x2) and σf (x2)− σf (x1) 6 x2 − x1.
2. πf(x1) 6 πf (x2) and πf (x2)− πf(x1) 6 x2 − x1.
Proof. Pick any f ∈ F . First we show that σf (x1) 6 σf (x2). To simplify notation,
let yi := σf (xi). Suppose instead that y1 > y2. We aim to show that, in this case,
βf(y1) + ℓ(x2 − y1) < βf(y2) + ℓ(x2 − y2), (30)
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which contradicts the definition of y2.
15 To establish (30), observe that y1 is optimal
at x1 and y2 < y1, so βf(y1) + ℓ(x1 − y1) < βf(y2) + ℓ(x1 − y2). Hence
βf(y1) + ℓ(x2 − y1) < βf(y2) + ℓ(x1 − y2) + ℓ(x2 − y1)− ℓ(x1 − y1).
Since ℓ is strictly convex and y2 < y1, we have ℓ(x2− y1)− ℓ(x1− y1) < ℓ(x2− y2)−
ℓ(x1 − y2). Combining this with the last inequality yields (30).
Next we show that a1 6 a2, where a1 := πf(x1) and a2 := πf (x2). To induce the
contradiction, suppose that a2 < a1. As a result, we have 0 6 a2 < a1 6 x1, and
hence a2 was available when a1 was chosen. Therefore,
βf(x1 − a1) + ℓ(a1) < βf(x1 − a2) + ℓ(a2),
where the strict inequality is due to the fact that minimizers are unique. Rearranging
and adding βf(x2 − a1) to both sides gives
βf(x2 − a1) + ℓ(a1) < βf(x2 − a1)− βf(x1 − a1) + βf(x1 − a2) + ℓ(a2).
Given that f is convex and a2 < a1, we have
f(x2 − a1)− f(x1 − a1) 6 f(x2 − a2)− f(x1 − a2).
Combining this with the last inequality, we obtain
βf(x2 − a1) + ℓ(a1) < βf(x2 − a2) + ℓ(a2),
contradicting optimality of a2.
16
To complete the proof of Lemma A.6, we also need to show that σf(x2)− σf (x1) 6
x2 − x1, and similarly for πf . Starting with the first case, we have
σf (x2)− σf (x1) = x2 − πf (x2)− x1 + πf (x1) = x2 − x1 + πf(x1)− πf (x2).
As shown above, πf (x1) 6 πf (x2), so σf (x2)−σf (x1) 6 x2−x1, as was to be shown.
The corresponding proof for πp is obtained in the same way, by reversing the roles
of σp and πp. This concludes the proof of Lemma A.6. 
Lemma A.7. If f ∈ F , then σf(x) = 0 if and only if x 6 η.
15Note that y1 < x1 6 x2, so y1 is available when y2 is chosen.
16Note that 0 6 a1 6 x1 6 x2, so a1 is available when a2 is chosen.
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Proof. First suppose that x 6 η. Seeking a contradiction, suppose there exists a
y ∈ (0, x] such that ℓ(x − y) + βf(y) < ℓ(x). Since f ∈ F we have f(y) > ℓ′(0)y
and hence
βf(y) > βℓ′(0)y > ℓ′(η)y.
Since x 6 η, this implies that βf(y) > ℓ′(x)y. Combining these inequalities gives
ℓ(x− y) + ℓ′(x)y < ℓ(x), contradicting convexity of ℓ.
Now suppose that σf (x) = 0. We claim that x 6 η, or, equivalently ℓ
′(x) 6 βℓ′(0).
To prove ℓ′(x) 6 βℓ′(0), observe that since f ∈ F we have f(y) 6 ℓ(y), and hence
ℓ(x) 6 ℓ(x− y) + βf(y) 6 ℓ(x− y) + βℓ(y) for ally 6 x.
It follows that
ℓ(x)− ℓ(x− y)
y
6
βℓ(y)
y
for all y 6 x.
Taking the limit gives ℓ′(x) 6 βℓ′(0). 
Lemma A.8. Let f ∈ F . If x > η, then πf(x) > η. If x 6 η, then πf(x) = x.
Proof. By Lemma A.6, πf is increasing, and hence if η 6 x, then πf (x) > πf (η) =
η − σf(η) = η. (The last equality is by Lemma A.7.) If x 6 η, then πf (x) =
x− σf (x) = x. 
Lemma A.9. If f ∈ F then Tf ∈ F .
Proof. Let f ∈ F . First we show that ℓ′(0)x 6 Tf(x) 6 ℓ(x) for all x ∈ R+. To
see that Tf 6 ℓ, fix x ∈ R+ and observe that, since f ∈ F implies f(0) = 0, we
have Tf(x) 6 ℓ(x) + βf(0) = ℓ(x). To see that Tf(x) > ℓ′(0)x for all x ∈ R+, pick
any such x. Using the assumption that f ∈ F , we have Tf(x) > miny6x{ℓ(x− y)+
βℓ′(0)y}. By β > 1 and convexity of ℓ, we have
ℓ(x− y) + βℓ′(0)y > ℓ′(0)y + ℓ′(0)(x− y) = ℓ′(0)x.
∴ Tf(x) > min
y6x
ℓ′(0)x = ℓ′(0)x.
Next we turn to continuity, monotonicity and convexity of Tf (recalling that each
f ∈ F is assumed to have these properties). The proof that Tf is convex is analo-
gous to the standard argument that concavity (in the max case) is preserved under
iteration by the Bellman operator (see, e.g., Stokey and Lucas (1989), Theorem 4.8)
and hence omitted. To see that Tf is monotone increasing and continuous, it suf-
fices to observe that Tf(x) = ℓ(πf (x)) + βf(σf(x)), and refer to the properties of
πf and σf obtained in Lemma A.6. 
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Lemma A.10. Let k ∈ N. If f, g ∈ F , then T kf = T kg on [0, kη].
Proof. The proof is by induction. First we argue that T 1f = T 1g on the interval
[0, η]. Next we show that if T kf = T kg on [0, kη], then T k+1f = T k+1g on [0, (k+1)η].
Together these two facts imply the claim in Lemma A.10.
To see that T 1f = T 1g on [0, η], pick any x ∈ [0, η] and recall from Lemma A.7 that
if h ∈ F and x 6 η, then Th(x) = ℓ(x). Applying this result to both f and g gives
Tf(x) = Tg(x) = ℓ(x). Hence T 1f = T 1g on [0, η] as claimed.
Turning to the induction step, suppose now that T kf = T kg on [0, kη], and pick any
x ∈ [0, (k + 1)η]. Let h ∈ F be arbitrary, let πh be the h-greedy function, and let
σh(x) := x− πh(x). By Lemma A.8, we have πh(x) > η, and hence
σh(x) 6 x− η 6 (k + 1)η − η 6 kη.
In other words, given function h, the optimal choice at x is less than kη. Since this
is true for both h = T kf and h = T kg, we have
T k+1f(x) = min
y6x
{ℓ(x− y) + βT kf(y)} = min
y6kη
{ℓ(x− y) + βT kf(y)}.
Using the induction step we can now write
T k+1f(x) = min
y6kη
{ℓ(x− y) + βT kg(y)} = min
y6x
{ℓ(x− y) + βT kg(y)}.
The last expression is just T k+1g(x), and we have now shown that T k+1f = T k+1g
on [0, (k + 1)η]. The proof is complete. 
Proposition A.11. The operator T has one and only one fixed point in F .
Proof. To show existence, let f ∗ := limn→∞ T
nℓ, where the limit is understood as
pointwise on R+. Existence of the limit will be clear from the following. Now fix
any x ∈ R+. Choose k ∈ N such that kη > x. Since ℓ ∈ F and T
j ∈ ℓ for all j ∈ N,
from Lemma A.10 we have T kℓ = T k(T jℓ) on [0, kη]. Taking limits with respect to
j gives
T kℓ = T k+jℓ = f ∗ on [0, kη].
It now follows that
Tf ∗(x) = TT kℓ(x) = T k+1ℓ(x) = f ∗(x).
Since x was arbitrary, we have shown that f ∗ is a fixed point of T .
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Regarding uniqueness, let f and g be two fixed points of T in F . Suppose they
differ at some x ∈ R+. Choose k such that kη > x. In view of Lemma A.10, we
have f(x) = T kf(x) = T kg(x) = g(x). Contradiction. 
Lemma A.12. If f ∈ F , then Tf is differentiable on (0,∞) with (Tf)′ = ℓ′ ◦ πf .
Proof. Fix f ∈ F and x0 > 0. By Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979), to show
that Tf is differentiable at x0 it suffices to exhibit an open neighborhood U ∋ x0
and a function w : U → R such that w is convex, differentiable, satisfies w(x0) =
Tf(x0) and dominates Tf on U . To this end, observe that by Lemma A.8, we have
σf (x0) < x0. Now choose an open neighborhood U of x0 such that tf(x0) < x for
every x ∈ U . On U , define
w(x) := ℓ(x− σf (x0)) + βf(σf(x0)).
It is straightforward to check that w is convex and differentiable on U , with w(x0) =
Tf(x0) and w(x) > Tf(x) whenever x ∈ U . As a result, Tf is differentiable at x0
with (Tf)′(x0) = w
′(x0) = ℓ
′(πf(x0)). 
Lemma A.13. If f ∈ F , then Tf is strictly convex.
Proof. The proof is elementary and hence omitted. 
Let f ∗ be the unique fixed point of T in F , existence and uniqueness of which was
shown above. Let π = πf∗ be the f
∗-greedy function, and let σ(x) := x− π(x). Let
σt be the t-th composition of σ with itself.
Lemma A.14. Together, π and σ satisfy
ℓ′(π(σ(x))) = max
{
ℓ′(π(x))
β
, ℓ′(0)
}
, ∀ x ∈ R+. (31)
Proof. If x = 0 the result is trivial, so assume instead that x > 0. Recall that
π(x) = argmin06a6x {ℓ(a) + βf
∗(x − a)}, and hence, by the first order condition,
ℓ′(π(x)) − β(f ∗)′(x − π(x)) > 0 with equality whenever π(x) > 0. Rearranging,
using the fact that f ∗ = Tf ∗ and the result in Lemma A.12, we can write this as
ℓ′(π(x)) > βℓ′(π(σ(x))) with equality when π(x) > 0. (32)
Consider first the case where x > η. In this case, by Lemma A.8, we have π(x) >
η > 0. Hence, by (32), we have ℓ′(π(σ(x))) = ℓ′(π(x))/β, and it remains only to
show that ℓ′(π(x))/β > ℓ′(0).
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To see this, note that when x > η it cannot be that η = x¯. It follows from the
definition of η that if η < x¯, then ℓ′(η) = βℓ′(0). Using π(x) > η and monotonicity
of ℓ′, we have
ℓ′(π(x))
β
>
ℓ′(η)
β
= ℓ′(0).
Now consider the case where x 6 η. Then, in view of Lemma A.7, we have σ(x) = 0.
Because π(0) = 0, we conclude that ℓ′(π(σ(x))) = ℓ′(0). It remains only to show
that ℓ′(π(x))/β 6 ℓ′(0). Since π(x) 6 η, this again follows from the definition of
η. 
Lemma A.15. Let x¯ be as defined in (ML). If at := π(σ
t(x¯)) for t > 0, then {at}
is the unique solution to (ML).
Proof. It suffices to show that {at} satisfies (26). First we claim that
∑
t at = x¯.
Let xt := σ
t(x¯). It is trivial to show that xt+1 = xt − at, and hence it suffices to
show that xt → 0. In view of Lemma A.8, if xt > η, then at = π(xt) > η, while if
xt 6 η then at = π(xt) = xt. As a consequence, there exists an M ∈ N with xt = 0
for all t > M .
It remains to show that
ℓ′(at+1) = max
{
1
β
ℓ′(at), ℓ
′(0)
}
for any t. This expression can be obtained by evaluating (31) at x = σt(x¯). 
Lemma A.16. The unique fixed point of T in F is the value function F .
Proof. Since f ∗ solves the functional equation (3), and since π is f ∗-greedy, we have
f ∗(x) = ℓ(π(x)) + βf ∗(σ(x)). Iterating on this equation yields
f ∗(x) =
T−1∑
t=0
βtℓ(π(σt(x))) + βTf ∗(σT (x)) =
T−1∑
t=0
βtℓ(at) + β
Tf ∗(σT (x)). (33)
As shown in the proof of Lemma A.15, the sequence at := π(σ
t(x¯)) is optimal, and
σt(x) = 0 for all t sufficiently large. Thus, by taking T → ∞ in (33), we have
f ∗(x) =
∑∞
t=0 β
tℓ(at) = F (x). 
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Completing the Discrete Time Proofs. We can now complete the claims from
Section 2.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Part 1 of Theorem 2.1 follows from Lemma A.16. Part 2
follows from Lemmas A.10–A.16. Part 3 follows from Lemma A.6 and the discussion
immediately above. Part 4 is due to Lemma A.12, applied to f = F . Part 5 follows
from Lemma A.15. Part 5 is due to Proposition A.4. 
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Sufficiency. Let x∗0 = 1 and x
∗
t = x
∗
t−1 − a
∗
t−1 for t > 1. Let
{at} be any feasible sequence. Let x0 = 1 and xt = xt−1 − at−1. It suffices to prove
that
D := lim
T→∞
T∑
t=0
βt[ℓ(a∗t )− ℓ(at)] 6 0.
Since ℓ is convex, we have
D = lim
T→∞
T∑
t=0
βt[ℓ(x∗t − x
∗
t+1)− ℓ(xt − xt+1)]
6 lim
T→∞
T∑
t=0
βtℓ′(a∗t )(x
∗
t − xt − x
∗
t+1 + xt+1).
Since x0 = x
∗
0 = 1, rearranging gives
D 6 lim
T→∞
T∑
t=0
βt(x∗t+1 − xt+1)[βℓ
′(a∗t+1)− ℓ
′(a∗t )]− β
T ℓ′(a∗T )(x
∗
T+1 − xT+1).
Since βℓ′(a∗t+1) = ℓ
′(a∗t ), the summation is zero and β
T ℓ′(a∗T ) = ℓ
′(a∗0). We have
D 6 − lim
T→∞
ℓ′(a∗0)(x
∗
T+1 − xT+1).
Since {at} and {a
∗
t} are feasible, xT+1 and x
∗
T+1 go to zero when T →∞. Therefore,
D 6 0.
Existence and Uniqueness. Since {a∗t} is feasible and satisfies βℓ
′(a∗t+1) = ℓ
′(a∗t )
for all t, we have
1 =
∞∑
t=0
a∗t =
∞∑
t=0
(ℓ)′−1
(
1
βt
ℓ′(a∗0)
)
=: g(a∗0),
where (ℓ′)−1 is well defined on [0, limx→∞ ℓ
′(x)] because ℓ is increasing, strictly con-
vex, and ℓ′(0) = 0. Hence, g is well defined on R+ and g(a
∗
0) is continuous and
strictly increasing in a∗0. Since g(0) = 0 and g(1) > 1, there exists a unique a
∗
0 > 0
such that {a∗t} satisfying βℓ
′(a∗t+1) = ℓ
′(a∗t ) is feasible, a
∗
t > 0 for all t, and {a
∗
t} is
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strictly decreasing. That {a∗t} is an optimal solution then follows from the sufficiency
part. Since ℓ is strictly convex, the solution is unique.
Necessity. Since we have pinned down a unique solution of (ML) which satisfies
βℓ′(a∗t+1) = ℓ
′(a∗t ), the condition is also necessary. 
Proof of Proposition 3.1. We must verify that (F, a∗) satisfies Definition 3.1. We
first consider the case of ℓ′(0) > 0. By Theorem 2.1, the value function F is a
solution to the Bellman equation (3), and hence satisfies
F (s) = min
06v6s
{c(v) + (1 + τ)F (s− v)} for all s ∈ [0, 1]. (34)
By the same theorem, it lies in the class F of increasing, convex and continuous
functions f : R+ → R+ such that c
′(0)s 6 f(s) 6 c(s) for all s ∈ R+. In addition,
with {xi} as the optimal state process (see Part 5 of Theorem 2.1) we have,
F (xi) = {c(a
∗
i ) + (1 + τ)F (xi+1)} for all i > 0. (35)
We need to show that 1–3 of Definition 3.1 hold when p = F and v = a∗. Part 1
is immediate because F ∈ F and all functions in F must have this property, while
Part 2 follows directly from (34). To see that Part 3 of Definition 3.1 also holds, let
bi = xi, where xi is as defined in Part 5 of Theorem 2.1. By the definition of the
state process, the sequence {bi} then corresponds to the downstream boundaries
of a set of firms obeying task allocation {a∗i }. The profits of firm i are Πi =
F (bi) − c(a
∗
i ) − (1 + τ)F (bi+1). By (35) and bi = xi, we have Πi = 0 for all i.
Hence Part 3 of Definition 3.1 also holds, as was to be shown.
If ℓ′(0) = 0, part 1 follows from the definition of the value function (2). By The-
orem 2.2, for any t with 0 6 t 6 1, there exists a unique optimal allocation {a∗t,j}
such that F (t) =
∑
j β
jℓ(a∗t,j), and
∑
j a
∗
t,j = t. Since {s − t, a
∗
t,0, a
∗
t,1, . . .} is a fea-
sible allocation at stage s with t 6 s 6 1, part 2 follows from the definition of the
value function. To see part 3, let b0 = 1 and bi = bi−1 − a
∗
i−1. By Theorem 2.2,
we have ℓ′(a∗i ) = (1 + τ)ℓ
′(a∗i+1). Since
∑∞
i=j a
∗
i = bj for all j, it follows again
from Theorem 2.2 that {a∗i }
∞
i=j is an optimal allocation for stage bj . Therefore,
p(bi) =
∑∞
j=0(1 + τ)
jc(a∗i+j) = c(a
∗
i ) + (1 + τ)p(bi+1) for all i. Hence, Πi = 0 for all
i. 
Appendix B. Proofs for Continuous Time Theory
Assumption 4.1 is imposed throughout.
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B.1. Proof of Theorem 4.1. In this section, we consider a relatively more general
problem:
min
x(t),a(t)
∫ ∞
0
g(t, x(t), a(t))dt (36)
subject to
x˙(t) = f(t, x(t), a(t)), x(0) = x0, lim
t→∞
x(t) = x1, and a(t) ∈ U ⊂ R ∀t. (37)
Throughout the appendix, we assume that f and g are continuously differentiable
with respect to x, a, and t, and a(·) is piecewise continuous. Define the Hamiltonian
by
H(x(t), a(t), λ(t), t) = λ(t)f(t, x(t), a(t))− g(t, x(t), a(t)) (38)
and denote the partial derivatives of H by Hx, Ha, and Hλ. We have the following
theorem.17
Theorem B.1. Consider problem (36) subject to (37). Assume there exists (x∗(t), a∗(t))
such that the cost function is finite. Suppose there exists (x∗(t), a∗(t)) satisfying (37)
and continuously differentiable λ(t) such that the following conditions hold:
1. λ˙(t) = −Hx(x
∗(t), a∗(t), λ(t), t) except at points of discontinuity of a∗(t);
2. H(x∗(t), a∗(t), λ(t), t) = maxa∈U H(x
∗(t), a, λ(t), t) for all t;
3. H is jointly concave in x and a;
4. U is convex.
Then (x∗(t), a∗(t)) is a solution to problem (36). Moreover, if H is strictly concave
in x and a, (x∗(t), a∗(t)) is a unique solution.
Our continuous time problem (MLC) fits in this framework if we let g(t, x(t), a(t)) =
eρtℓ(a(t)), f(t, x(t), a(t)) = −a(t), U = [0,∞), x0 = x¯ > 0, and x1 = 0. The
Hamiltonian is thus
H(x(t), a(t), λ(t), t) = −λ(t)a(t)− eρtℓ(a(t)). (39)
It is easy to check that all the conditions in Theorem B.1 are satisfied as long as
there exists a constant λ satisfying (18) and (19).
We shall prove that such λ indeed exists and is unique when ℓ′(0) = 0. Since ℓ is
increasing, strictly convex, and continuously differentiable, h := (ℓ′)−1 is well defined
on an interval [0,M) of R+, where M = lima→∞ ℓ
′(a). Moreover, h is continuous,
17For more general versions of this sufficiency theorem, see (Acemoglu, 2008, Chapter 7),
Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1977), or Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1986).
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strictly increasing, and ranges from zero to infinity. When −λe−ρt falls into the
domain of h, (18) implies that
a∗(t;λ) = h(−λe−ρt). (40)
Because of the properties of h,
∫∞
0
a∗(t;λ)dt is strictly increasing and ranges from
zero to infinity. Therefore, there exists a unique λ such that (18) and (19) hold. It
then follows from Theorem B.1 that a∗ in (18) is the unique solution to problem
(MLC). Part 1 of Theorem 4.1 for ℓ′(0) > 0 can be proved in a similar way and we
leave it to the reader.
When ℓ′(0) = 0, −λe−ρt is always in the domain of h. Therefore, a∗ is given by (40)
and is decreasing and strictly positive. When ℓ′(0) > 0, 0 is not in the domain of h;
(18) implies that a∗ will become zero when t is large enough. This proves part 2 of
Theorem 4.1.
Define the value function V : [0,∞)×R→ R for problem (36) by
V (t, x) = inf
x(s),a(s)
∫ ∞
t
g(s, x(s), a(s))ds (41)
subject to
x˙(s) = f(s, x(s), a(s)), x(t) = x, lim
s→∞
x(s) = x1, and a(s) ∈ U ⊂ R ∀s.
We have the following necessary conditions for optimality18.
Theorem B.2. Suppose V (t, x) is differentiable with respect to t and x and there
exists (x∗(t), a∗(t)) that solves problem (36). Then V is the solution to the HJB
equation
− Vt(t, x) = inf
a∈U
{g(t, x, a) + Vx(t, x)f(t, x, u)} (42)
with boundary condition limt→∞ V (t, x(t)) = 0 and (x
∗(t), a∗(t)) satisfies
−Vt(t, x
∗(t)) = inf
a∈U
{g(t, x∗(t), a) + Vx(t, x
∗(t))f(t, x∗(t), a)}
= g(t, x∗(t), a∗(t)) + Vx(t, x
∗(t))f(t, x∗(t), a∗(t)).
(43)
For discounted optimal control problems, if we can write g(t, x, a) = eρtg(x, a) and
f(t, x, a) = f(x, a), we can define the stationary value function by F (x) := V (0, x).
Then we have a stationary version of (42):
− ρF (x) = inf
a∈U
{g(x, a) + F ′(x)f(x, a)} . (44)
18For more general versions of this theorem, see, for example, Bressan and Piccoli (2007),
Acemoglu (2008), or Liberzon (2011)
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The differentiability of F follows from Theorem 7.17 of Acemoglu (2008). From
part 1 we know that an optimal control exists, so we can apply Theorem B.2. This
concludes part 3 of Theorem 4.1.
B.2. Production Chains in Continuous Time. Consider the general problem:
min
x(t),a(t),T>0
∫ T
0
g(t, x(t), a(t))dt+ L(T ) (45)
subject to
x˙(t) = f(t, x(t), a(t)), x(0) = x0, x(T ) = x1, and a(t) ∈ U ⊂ R ∀t. (46)
Assume L is twice continuously differentiable and L(t)→∞ as t→∞. Define the
new Hamiltonian by
H(x(t), a(t), λ(t), t) = λ(t)f(t, x(t), a(t))− g(t, x(t), a(t))− L˙(t). (47)
Since L(T ) can become arbitrarily large, we can find a large T¯ and choose T from
[0, T¯ ] without loss of generality. We have the following sufficiency theorem.
Theorem B.3 (Seierstad (1984)). Consider problem (45) subject to (46) with U
bounded. Suppose for each δ 6 T¯ there exists (xδ(t), aδ(t)) satisfying (46) and
continuously differentiable λδ(t) such that the following conditions hold:
1. λ˙δ(t) = −Hx(xδ(t), aδ(t), λδ(t), t) except at points of discontinuity of aδ(t);
2. H(xδ(t), aδ(t), λδ(t), t) = maxa∈U H(xδ(t), a, λδ(t), t) for all t;
3. H is jointly concave in x and a;
4. U is convex.
Moreover, suppose there is no other λδ such that the above conditions hold. Then, if
there exists T ∗ such that H(xδ(δ), aδ(δ), λδ(δ), δ) > 0 for δ < T
∗ and H(xδ(δ), aδ(δ),
λδ(δ), δ) 6 0 for δ > T
∗. Then (xT ∗(·), aT ∗(·), T
∗) is a solution to problem (45).
In problem (MLCF), g(t, x, a) = eρtℓ(a), f(t, x, a) = −a, and ℓ′(0) = 0. Assume
L(t) = Beρt with B > 0 as in Fally and Hillberry (2018). Then, for any fixed δ, we
have aδ(t) = h(−λδe
−ρt) where λδ satisfies that
∫ δ
0
aδ(t)dt = x¯. Since for λ 6= λδ,
a that minimizes H(xδ(t), a, λ, t) satisfies a = h(−λe
−ρt) 6= aδ, there is no other λδ
such that all the conditions hold. Moreover, we have
H(xδ(δ), aδ(δ), λδ(δ), δ) = −λδaδ(δ)− e
ρδℓ(aδ(δ))− ρBe
ρδ
d
dδ
H(xδ(δ), aδ(δ), λδ(δ), δ) = −
dλδ
dδ
aδ(δ)− ρe
ρδℓ(aδ(δ))− ρ
2Beρδ
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where dλδ
dδ
> 0 is the derivative given by applying the implicit function theorem
on
∫ δ
0
h(−λδe
−ρt)dt = x¯. Therefore, H(xδ(δ), aδ(δ), λδ(δ), δ) is strictly decreas-
ing in δ. If we can find T ∗ such that H(xT ∗(T
∗), aT ∗(T
∗), λT ∗(T
∗), T ∗) = 0, then
(xT ∗(·), aT ∗(·), T
∗) is optimal. Therefore, the solutions given in Fally and Hillberry
(2018) are optimal.
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